Over the past forty years or so, the techniques and practice of negotiation have been applied to crisis situations confronted by law enforcement personnel. The early beginnings are generally traced back to the New York Police Department (NYPD) in the 1970s, to events in the world that tended to feature hostage taking as a key element of criminal and political behavior. From infrequent use to standard practice, crisis negotiation has become commonplace in law enforcement. The context, content, and process of crisis negotiation will be broadly considered in this chapter.

Because of the extensive literature on the topics of crisis/hostage negotiation and space limitations in a chapter such as this, the approach taken herein is to organize the material according to distinct subtopics. Each subtopic will be briefly covered, paying particular attention to information that may be useful for those interested in applied criminal psychology. Reference citations at the chapter’s end should be helpful in further exploring the many aspects of crisis/hostage negotiation.

Throughout the chapter, the terms crisis negotiation, hostage negotiation, and crisis/hostage negotiation will be used interchangeably. This is often the case in the literature cited. Crisis intervention is also a term that is frequently paired with negotiation. The use of these terms, which is reflective of changes in philosophy and practice as the field evolved, should be clear when taken in the context of article, chapter, or book cited. A barricade situation is one in which a subject refuses to come out, sometimes with or without hostages. Hostages (persons held against their will as a form of barter) play a key role in negotiation considerations. Unless otherwise stated, negotiator refers to appropriately trained and duly authorized police personnel.
BACKGROUND, HISTORY, AND ICONS

The historical events that laid the foundation for the need for hostage negotiation as a police approach include the Munich massacre of Olympic athletes at the hands of terrorists in 1972, as well as the spate of airline jackings that seemed epidemic in the 1970s. McMains and Mullins (1996) provide a concise discussion of the events in the development of the NYPD hostage negotiation concept as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) initiatives that followed. Many of the classic articles on hostage negotiation were assembled in a compendium by Romano, Getz, and McCann (1998). Other authors have devoted some attention to the development of hostage negotiation techniques in law enforcement (e.g., Blau, 1994) and crisis situations (e.g., James, 2008).

What has been referred to as “first-generation” hostage negotiation (the police response to terrorist and political activities) has gradually evolved into “second-generation” crisis intervention (applying crisis intervention principles to criminal encounters and domestic disturbances). Many hostage negotiation teams (HNT) were renamed crisis negotiation teams (CNT) to reflect this refinement of philosophy and technique (e.g., OCSO, 1999, 2001). A good summary of the evolution of hostage negotiation in law enforcement is provided by Call (2003).

When one enters the literature on crisis/hostage negotiation, almost immediately two names come to the fore: Frank Bolz and Harvey Schlossberg. These two individuals share the credit for introducing and developing the techniques of crisis negotiation for law enforcement application. Each gave an account of his role in the process – Bolz in Hostage Cop (Bolz & Hershey, 1979) and Schlossberg in Psychologist with a Gun (Schlossberg & Freeman, 1974). In person, each can tell many tales of how things came to be. No doubt one person played off the other in a synergistic way that led to the refinement of a method that has found its way to almost all law enforcement agencies today. However, recognition must also go to the late Simon Eisdorfer, who is credited with developing the NYPD hostage negotiation team (New York Times, 2005).

EARLY TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT OF BASIC MODELS

In the beginning, the application of negotiation in the law enforcement context simply meant talking to the suspect, rather than using a tactical approach to resolve a crisis situation. Talking was seen as a better alternative to force, especially when the lives of innocent hostages hung in the balance (Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986). So, the strategy to “isolate, contain, and negoti-
ate” emerged. Training models emphasized the importance of time and containment to the effective resolution of potentially lethal encounters. Trainers instructed would-be negotiators in the history, development, philosophy, and techniques of negotiation that emerged from police trial and error applications. Anecdotes and “war stories” were plentiful in early training sessions (Bolz & Hershey, 1979; Schlossberg & Freeman, 1974). Not much emphasis was placed on communication techniques per se, other than the need to convince the barricaded suspect/hostage taker to give up and come out. Negotiators were generally selected for their ability to carry on a good conversation.

As negotiation began to take hold in the law enforcement arsenal, the process came under scrutiny in an effort to better understand the dynamics in typical situations (see Abbott, 1986; Wesselius & DeSarno, 1983; Whittle, 1988). In a study conducted by Holmes (1991), an attempt was made to formulate a developmental phase model of negotiation; however, the model seemed to fit training simulation situations better than it did actual hostage situations. Other models attempted to fit the elements of a crisis situation into negotiator training (Herndon, 1994) or to provide useful analogies that might facilitate training (Herndon, 1996), or both.

Abbott (1986) presented a time-phased model for hostage negotiation based on time-sequence relationships that occur during the negotiation process. This was intended to be used as a yardstick by which to measure the process of negotiations. Similarly, Strentz (1995) discussed the cyclic crisis negotiation time line that can help a negotiator determine that a situation is winding down toward a peaceful solution.

Figure 12-1. shows the major components in police crisis negotiation, around which this chapter is organized. The content (players) of negotiation includes the hostage taker, the hostages (victims), and the hostage negotiator. Issues surrounding each are presented in what follows. The context of negotiation, in terms of this chapter, is the law enforcement crisis team call out. The process of negotiation includes the dynamic interactions that occur between and among all players. External forces, such as organizational, social and political pressures, tend to impinge on the process. Mental health consultants often play a role in the outcome. In addition, time is always a factor.
APPLICATION AND EXAMINATION OF THE PROCESS

From the very beginning of the application of negotiation techniques to law enforcement situations, there have been efforts to examine the process, not only to explicate and elucidate but also to educate. Schlossberg (1979) described in general terms the police response to hostage situations, and Fuselier (1981) provided a practical overview of hostage negotiations. Even the moral considerations involved in police responses to hostage takers have been explored (Betz, 1982).

Maksymchuk (1982) provided a very basic outline of the types of hostage takers, hostage situations, and offensive actions to be considered in most police calls for assistance. The anatomy of a hostage situation was presented by Wesselius and DeSarno (1983) as they exemplified the social psychological interplay between hostage and hostage taker. Friedland (1986) examined hostage negotiation types, processes, and outcomes. An empirical examination of the process of negotiation between a barricaded subject and police negotiators was detailed by Powell (1989) in his doctoral dissertation at the University of Iowa.

The high-risk factors associated with crisis/hostage situations were discussed by Fuselier, Van Zandt, and Lanceley (1991); these factors were identified as those that increase the possibility of the victim being killed or the
hostage taker committing suicide. Among these factors were the subject being under multiple stressors prior to the incident, the subject’s background of male dominance, prior similar incidents and problems with the hostage, and, the subject’s lack of family or social support systems. Ramesh (1992) was critical of police negotiation by stating that strategies employed not only may fail to resolve certain hostage situations but may also continue to invest the police with power to define meanings and to characterize the service they render to the public.

Dolnik (2003) contrasted the dynamics of crisis negotiations in barricade versus kidnapping incidents. Because of the differences cited (location of victims and identity of perpetrators), the components of crisis negotiation that have been successful in resolving barricade situations may be inapplicable to kidnappings. Other important variables and distinctions occurring in crisis situations faced by negotiators are discussed in the edited work of Rogan, Hammer and Van Zandt (1997). A full range of psychological aspects of crisis negotiation is covered in the chapters put together by Strentz (2006).

COMMUNICATIONS AND SPECIALIZED TECHNIQUES

Negotiation is fundamentally communication. This statement may seem overly simplistic; however, it is important to realize that the emphasis on communication techniques did not come until many lessons had been learned through ineffective communications in hostage situations. Early negotiation was a strategy of containment and isolation, allowing time to work in favor of the release of hostages and using negotiation to stall and vent (defuse) the situation. Unfortunately, in law enforcement (as well as in other occupations), time is money, and overtime pay considerations often led to an action imperative to “go tactical.” Better communication techniques were needed to resolve situations peacefully in a timely manner.

Early arguments were made for negotiation over tactical assaults (e.g. Bolz, 1982). Organizational resistance and inertia were hard to overcome in the early years of negotiation. Talk was tolerated, but only for so long. Communication strategies came under scrutiny. Richardson (1983) examined the communication strategies in barricade and hostage confrontations to include the rationale for the commitment to resolve such crises through communication rather than through tactical assault, the underlying theory and research, and the actual strategies recommended and practised by negotiators as taught by the FBI Academy. He proposed suggestions to refine communication response strategies, both short term and long term. Other communication analysis studies are reported by Fowler, Devivo and Fowler (1985) and Rogan (1990).
Mullins (1995) offered some advanced communication techniques for hostage negotiators, those designed to influence others and increase compliance. Other researchers examined the message affect in crisis negotiations (Rogan & Hammer, 1995), and Slatkin (1996) made the case for therapeutic communication.

Recognition of the importance of active listening became the focus of consideration among hostage negotiators (Noesner & Webster, 1997). Royce (2005) analyzed the critical role of active listening in the case of a police negotiator in New South Wales, Australia during the process of serving a high-risk warrant on an armed suspect. Royce concluded that active listening was a critical factor in the resolution of the crisis. Keenan (2007) encouraged the development of an empathetic response in police crisis negotiators, noting that trainees who were exposed to the FBI-CNT model showed no increase in the level of observed emotional empathy as demonstrated by pre- and post-training testing.

Some researchers have argued for the importance of roleplaying as a means to increase negotiator effectiveness (Van Hasselt & Romano, 2004; Van Hasselt, Romano & Vecchi, 2008). Certainly, roleplaying contributes to the development of better negotiation skills by adding situational realism. Research focusing directly on the communication process during crisis situations has shown that verbal communication has a direct impact on the outcome (McClain, 2004; McClain, Callaghan, Madrigal, Unwin & Castoreno, 2006). The value of words as disarming tools was noted by Charles (1999; 2007) and Slatkin (2005) who offered a general guide to some useful communication stratagems and strategies for law enforcement.

Taylor (2002) proposed a cylindrical model of communication behavior that posited the interrelationships among communication behaviors in crisis negotiation. By analyzing 189 dialogue spans transcribed from nine resolved cases and using forty-one coding variables, Taylor identified three dominant levels of suspect-negotiator interaction (avoidance, distributive, integrative) and three thematic styles of communication (identity, instrumental, relational). Such research contributes to a better understanding of communication dynamics, which are essential to crisis resolution.

Communication as negotiation, and vice versa, is essential to effective crisis resolution. Listening and understanding require disciplined practice, and true communication can be inhibited by world view differences between law enforcement and other categories of people (see Docherty, 1998). Intelligence gathering is a never-ending component of crisis negotiation.
HOSTAGE-TAKER ISSUES

Behind hostage-taking behavior can be found motive. Behavior tends to be purposeful; hostages are usually taken for a reason. An excellent discussion of the variations of motives found in different types of hostage takers can be found in Hacker (1976). Knowing that one is motivated by personal (emotional), criminal (instrumental), or social/political (ideological) issues certainly makes a difference with regard to the negotiation tactics and strategies employed. Why people take hostages is a paramount issue in resolving standoffs successfully. As a minimum, such knowledge can serve to facilitate communication.

There has been some consideration in the literature for the case of dealing with various personality types (disordered or otherwise), such as the antisocial personality or the paranoid schizophrenic. Lanceley (1981) discussed the former, describing features of this type of personality disorder and offering the negotiator tips on how to deal with such hostage takers. Strentz (1983) focused on the “inadequate personality” as a hostage taker. It is interesting that this carryover from the 1968 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-II) still influences present-day negotiator thinking. This speaks to the danger of getting stuck on labels. Whereas mental health professionals may be able to ignore such archaic labels (i.e. no longer in DSM) and focus on the presenting symptoms, less knowledgeable negotiators may get stuck (the training literature still uses the term “inadequate personality” to this day) to the detriment of effective negotiation. A hostage taker is not merely a diagnostic label, and poor labeling clouds behavioral prediction. Perhaps, it would be better to focus on overt behavior during and immediately prior to a crisis, rather than off-the-cuff diagnoses or someone else’s opinion of the suitable label.

No doubt, however, mental status of the negotiator is an issue to contend with. A common encounter during crisis situations tends to be the person suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. Strentz (1986a) discussed negotiating with the hostage taker who displays symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia. More recently, Mohandie and Duffy (1999) spoke to the symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia in greater detail, its prevalence in society, violence risk associated with the illness, and crisis management strategies. They provide negotiator/first responder guidelines. Taking a broader view, Miller (2007) presented an outline of guiding principles and techniques for negotiating with the most common forms of mentally disordered hostage takers.

Other complicating factors besides motivation and mental status include language and age. DiVasto (1996) considered the particular difficulties encountered when one attempts to negotiate with a hostage taker who does not speak English as a first language. It becomes imperative to have interpreters
available if negotiation is to proceed effectively. When dealing with older persons in crisis, there may be a particular concern about suicide potential. Slatkin (2003) pointed out that “negotiators need to employ strategies designed to incorporate the effects of aging and the older individual’s reaction to the aging process.” Terhune-Bickler (2005) addressed the impact of subject suicide on the negotiator. She noted, “when the negotiators were unable to ‘succeed’ in the sometimes unrealistic task of preventing the suicide, they felt a myriad of emotions, including defeat and betrayal.”

**NEGOTIATOR ISSUES**

What would crisis and hostage negotiation be without the negotiator? More than likely, it would become a police tactical engagement. Thus, the negotiator is the essential component in the process, the person in the middle between hostage takers and hostages. The negotiator is the wedge between peaceful surrender and dynamic confrontation. The negotiator is pivotal in ensuring a nonviolent resolution to situations that all too often escalate into chaos and tragedy. Given such a heavy responsibility, it is essential to consider the characteristics needed to be successful in the role of hostage negotiator.

Gelbart (1979) was among the first to address this issue. In his doctoral dissertation at the University of Southern California, he examined the psychological, personality, and biographical variables that seemed to be related to success as a negotiator. Strentz (2006) summarized the California study by pointing out that effective negotiators had highly adequate social skills, communications ability, self-assurance, and social presence. They were also intelligent, ambitious, forceful, insightful, resourceful, and versatile, according to measures on the California Psychological Inventory (CPI) and other instruments.

Other early research on the desirable qualities of hostage negotiators was conducted by Tatar (1982). He administered a standardized battery of personality and motivation measures to a group of experienced law enforcement officers who had volunteered for hostage negotiator training. He found that factor analysis produced four dimensions of high relevance to police work and hostage negotiation: emotional stability, extraversion, instinctual gratification, and liberal orientation.

Knowing something about what makes an effective hostage negotiator leads the way to the identification of optimal selection criteria and the delivery of relevant training. Gettys and Elam (1988) sought to do just that, to identify characteristics of negotiators and develop a selection model based on personality data. Survey data reflecting personality characteristics impor-
tant to hostage negotiators were compared with personality test data obtained from a sample of hostage negotiators. Results indicated that hostage negotiators were above average in their ability to communicate effectively with others, self-confident, good at divergent thinking, and helpful and sympathetic in their dealings with other people. Going beyond test data and personality characteristics, Birge and Birge (1994) pointed to the importance of police employment history as a predictor of success as a negotiator, meaning that past success in resolving crises should predict future success in similar situations. Gruchacz (1997) and Slatkin (1996) also addressed selection and training issues, respectively. Strentz (1996) focused on the sociopsychological traits of successful negotiators. More recent attention to the negotiator selection process (balancing departmental policies while selecting the right personnel) was the focus of research conducted by Kisthardt (2000). This research questioned the assumption that there is a specific set of personality traits common to all negotiators across all law enforcement agencies. Rather, each job in each agency is unique; job analysis must be completed prior to selection to ensure the psychological dimensions are fully understood.

Regini (2002) addressed the selection of the CNT leader, as well as the rest of the team, and the assignment of team responsibilities. His discussion provided an assortment of general traits of the effective leader (e.g. experience and knowledge), as well as some mention of specific familiarity with behavioral sciences and psychological and sociological concepts. The best CNT members seem to come from the ranks of the best criminal investigators; they tend to be nonconfrontational and nonjudgmental in their approach to cases and have exceptional interview and interrogation skills. The roles of primary negotiator, secondary negotiator, and other team members figure heavily in team effectiveness.

Firsthand accounts of the job of a hostage negotiator are insightful and aid one's understanding of the nature of the work and what kind of person is successful and effective. A publicized conversation between current and former members of the NYPD hostage negotiation team and an FBI crisis negotiator is a case in point (Cambria, DeFilippo, Louden & McGowan, 2002). Most recently, retired FBI agent Cliff Van Zandt published an account of his “life on the edge as an FBI hostage negotiator” (Van Zandt & Paisner, 2006). Lanceley (1999) published a useful on-scene guide that provides a good insight into the nature of the work of a negotiator.

HOSTAGE ISSUES

The hostage is at the heart of hostage negotiation. Safety and survival of the hostage undergird the process of negotiation and dictate the dynamics
thereof. The physical and psychological well-being of the hostage(s) is an ever-present concern for all parties involved. Hostages are the bargaining chips and become the focus of much attention, either directly or indirectly. The effects of being held hostage have received attention in the literature.

One of the earliest discussions of a well-recognized hostage reaction to being held captive, the Stockholm Syndrome, was provided by Strentz (1979). Identifying with the aggressor as an ego defense and developing negative feelings toward the police (who are seen as posing danger due to imminent tactical assault) form the basis for hostage survival strategy. Hillman (1981) described the psychopathology of being held hostage, and Solomon (1982) carried out an empirical study involving thirty-five former hostages using a forty-one-item questionnaire. The results supported the belief that the Stockholm Syndrome does develop in hostage situations and can be affected by negative hostage-taker treatment of hostages. On the other hand, Olin and Born (1983) argued that the Stockholm Syndrome is not inevitable and may depend on factors that are under police control to reduce the likelihood of violence being done to the hostages by the hostage-taker.

Fuselier (1988) considered, among other things, victim responses to being held hostage, the theoretical explanations for the Stockholm Syndrome, the psychological sequelae, and treatment suggestions after release from captivity. Suggestions for persons who may become hostages were provided by Bolz (1987) as a form of inoculation against negative effects and as tips to maximize survival. Giebels, Noelanders, and Vervaeke (2005) conducted eleven semi-structured and in-depth interviews with victims of two types of hostage taking (sieges and kidnapping); results showed that all hostages reported feelings of helplessness, but feelings of isolation and uncertainty were stronger among kidnap victims.

Attempts to put the Stockholm Syndrome in a balanced perspective are evident (see Fuselier, 1999). A recent article does a very good job of summarizing what is understood and misunderstood about the Stockholm Syndrome and victim responses to being held hostage (De Fabrique, Romano, Vecchi & Van Hasselt, 2007). An estimated prevalence rate of 27 percent (derived from data suggesting that 73 percent of captives show no evidence of the syndrome) is sufficient to warrant treatment approaches such as debriefings and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) interventions.

The primary aim of hostage negotiation is to obtain the release of hostages. Their well-being and safety drives the need for sound theory and practical applications of the behavioral sciences.
ROLE OF MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND USE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DATA

Central to the importance of this chapter is the role played by mental health professionals of various backgrounds in the process and outcome of crisis situations. Utilization of and reliance on these professionals has become more typical over the past few decades as law enforcement agencies have come to recognize the contributions that can be made by someone knowledgeable in applied behavioral science. Some of the relevant literature is highlighted in the following paragraphs.

As early as 1977, consideration was being given to the role of mental health professionals (i.e. non-law enforcement personnel) in police negotiations (see Pearce, 1977). Johnson (1978) expanded the discussion to a broader range of behavioral scientists. Powitsky (1979) considered the use and misuse of psychologists in a hostage situation. Hibler (1984) developed a consultation guide for mental health professionals who take part in hostage situations. Other early writings on this topic include Wardlaw (1984), Fuselier (1988), and McMains (1988). More recently, Feldman (2004) presented a general discussion of the role of the mental health consultant on hostage negotiation teams. Similarly, DeBarnardo (2004) considered the psychologist’s role in his discussion targeting emergency mental health professionals.

An empirical study conducted by Butler, Leitenberg and Fuselier (1993) surveyed 300 law enforcement agencies in the United States that employed a negotiator in hostage incidents. Thirty-nine percent indicated that they used a mental health consultant for negotiation teams. The use of a mental health consultant contributed to an increase in the number of incidents ending in surrender and a decrease in the number of incidents ending in tactical assault. The use of a mental health consultant to assess the perpetrator reduced the number of incidents resulting in injury or death of a hostage. This study provided data-driven support for the use of mental health professionals in crisis negotiation. Updated statistics pertaining to utilization and effectiveness can be found in Delprino and Bahn (1988) and Fuselier (1988).

Havassy (1994) supported the use of a psychologist as part of the negotiating team. Taking it further, Hatcher, Mohandie, Turner, and Gelles (1998) discussed the four roles and related functions of psychologists on crisis/hostage negotiation teams. They prefaced this by noting that “the invitation to the psychologist to participate in the hostage/crisis negotiation team appears to depend upon three factors.” Hatcher and colleagues (1998) identify these factors as mutual acceptance, professional credibility, and an ability to function in the field. The roles typically fulfilled by psychologists in crisis/hostage negotiation include the consultant/advisor, the integrated team mem-
ber, the primary negotiator, and the primary controller. These roles are ordered from most frequent to least frequent.

When using a mental health consultant, there are a series of questions that may be asked during the incident phase that call upon the expertise of a psychologist. Slatkin (2000) suggested a number of questions that can aid the negotiation process during the beginning, middle, and terminal phases. These questions focus on the psychological profile of the hostagetaker; characterizations of the situation; and suggested negotiation strategies, approaches, and directions.

The use of psychological data was a consideration raised by Poythress (1980). This predated the widespread use of psychologists who are better able to interpret and apply psychological data. The point is noted, however; psychological data in the wrong hands can be a hindrance as well as an aid to understanding behavior in the hostage/barricade context. Personal accounts about the experiences of psychologists on crisis negotiation teams add to the appreciation for their roles and insights (Herndon, 2003, 2006; Strentz, 2006).

**ORGANIZATIONAL AND SYSTEM RESPONSES**

Law enforcement organizations that assemble crisis negotiation teams must consider a number of issues. Matters of individual negotiator selection and training were mentioned earlier, but, from an organizational perspective, it is important to consider the structure and readiness of the entire team (see Regini, 2002). Early discussions in the literature focused on organizing the team (Maher, 1976), team values (Schlossberg, 1980), team development (McMains, 1995), and team profiles (Hammer, Van Zandt & Rogan, 1994; Rogan, Hammer & Van Zandt, 1994). The team must function as a unit, and it is imperative that joint training be conducted with the tactical team to ensure coordination and cooperation during high-risk calls (see OCSO, 2001 for an example of a high-risk incident general order). The high-risk incident commander has to ensure that both teams work well together. Magers (2007) discusses the importance of leadership, especially the ethical issues involved in making the best decision: negotiation versus tactical assault. Wind (1995) clarified the role of the field commander in critical incidents while Noesner (1999) addressed negotiation concepts for commanders. Vecchi (2002) offered in-sight into the conflicts that can arise between tactical and negotiating teams and how the two teams can collaborate for a successful outcome. Birge (2002) noted that balance is the key when it comes to the use of negotiation versus tactical responses.
The value of situation boards for use by negotiation teams is the subject of an article by Duffy (1997). Position papers are a means whereby expert negotiators can provide advice to teams during incidents (Dalfonzo & Romano, 2003). These tools can facilitate the process and contribute to an effective outcome.

Crisis negotiation is not just the concern of law enforcement. As Turner (1989) noted, there is the necessity for other organizations, such as healthcare facilities, to have a written response plan in place for the eventuality of a hostage incident. In a world of ever-increasing workplace violence, corporations and private companies must do their part to protect employees and customers/clients from danger while developing contingency plans that facilitate working with law enforcement in the event of an incident.

**PROCESS AND OUTCOME ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS**

With forty or so years of development and application, a fair question to ask, is how effective is crisis negotiation? Over the years, tracking incidents has been a hit or miss effort, with some agencies doing a better job than others of keeping accurate records of hostage/barricade situations that resulted in a team call out, and the resolution or outcome thereof. It was, and is, not uncommon in many agencies for negotiation teams to keep an after-action report; the challenge has been to build and maintain a centralized, nationwide database that is accurate and reliable. In the mid-1990s, the FBI began the hostage/barricade data system (HOBAS) in an attempt to rectify this problem. Only one reported study has been found in the peer-reviewed literature that reports an evaluation of the effectiveness of HOBAS. This study questioned whether HOBAS can be reasonably expected to render the representative, unbiased data that is expected from it (Lipetsker, 2004).

Prior to HOBAS, there were several noteworthy academic attempts at assessment and evaluation. For example, Leary (1980) focused his doctoral research at George Mason University on an evaluation of the FBI's hostage negotiation training program. Similarly, Strentz (1986b), in his doctoral research at Virginia Commonwealth University, conducted an evaluation of two training programs designed to enable hostages to cope more effectively with captivity stress. Head (1989) took a broader, systems perspective in his doctoral research at the State University of New York at Albany when he considered the specific characteristics of hostage incidents and the policies used by U.S. law enforcement agencies in handling them. For this research, Head created a database of U.S. hostage incidents occurring over a ten-year
period by drawing upon a number of official and unofficial sources. Survey research conducted by Zatwarnitski (1998) at George Mason University looked at the interpersonal and situational dynamics of hostage negotiation situations. Responses indicated that 70 percent of hostage takings were of a domestic nature and most hostages were women and children. Hostage takers were predominately male and were typically known by or related to the hostages. Louden (1999) analyzed the hostage negotiation practices of 276 local, county, and state police agencies in the United States (with at least 100 sworn officers) that used some standard system of negotiation response to hostage and barricade situations. This was a comprehensive study examining nine specific hypotheses and gathering extensive descriptive data. The findings added to what is known about the structure and processes of hostage negotiation teams. McGowan (2004) focused on the NYPD to study whether hostage and barricade incidents (selected sample) that are resolved violently differ from incidents that are resolved without violence. Findings and conclusions from this nontraditional contextual model approach to evaluation (departing from research that used a motivational model) support the hypothesis that a phenomenological model based on context, containment, and conversation is superior to a motivational model for predicting incident resolution. As laudable as these doctoral research projects are, more systematic research along these lines is needed before firm conclusions can be reached.

There is ample anecdotal and testimonial evidence that argues for the utilization of crisis negotiation over a tactical response, and there are corresponding accounts of success in the overwhelming number of incidents. Tracking hostage/barricade calls and tabulating peaceful resolutions in one medium-sized law enforcement agency in the southeastern United States from September 1992 through March 2002 revealed that 90.6 percent of the incidents resulted in a peaceful surrender (Herndon, 2003). One atypical incident was the focus of national media and served as the basis for refined training in tactics (Herndon, 2001). Taken as a whole, review of ten years’ experience as a psychologist on a hostage negotiation team pointed to several lessons learned: behavioral profiling is more effective than instant DSM diagnosis, criminal history is a good predictor of situation outcome, listening trumps talking, shrink talk can be nonsensical, and some situations are non-negotiable (Herndon, 2006). Lanceley (2004) addressed lessons learned from the vantage point of an FBI hostage negotiator; he compared the job of a salesman with being a negotiator. His lessons include recognizing a non-negotiable situation; realizing it is not about you; everyone on scene is a salesman/negotiator, so a consistent message is important; people believe in demonstrations far more than in words; keep it simple; and it is not over until it is over. In Facing Down Evil, retired FBI negotiator Clint Van Zandt
recounted most of his memorable cases and gave the reader a glimpse of what it is like to be on the inside (Van Zandt & Paisner, 2006). Impressions about the effectiveness of hostage negotiations can be derived from such personal accounts.

The most recent evaluation research that appears in the peer-reviewed literature is that of Van Hasselt and colleagues (2006) and Van Aelstyn (2007). Van Hasselt and co-workers (2006) report on an empirical investigation of crisis (hostage) negotiation training. Using forty-five FBI special agents, a pretest and posttest design found significant gains in scores as a result of the two-week training course. This, however, can in no way guarantee transfer of training success in the field. Van Aelstyn (2007) looked at perceived characteristics that facilitate the successful conclusion of crisis situations. He had difficulty discerning the degree to which negotiator education, experience, and training affected the outcome of negotiations.

The importance of crisis/hostage negotiation to police work in particular, and society in general, requires that evaluation research be an on-going effort. There should be formative as well as summative program evaluation, and attention needs to be paid to proximal as well as distal criteria. Content and process issues must be considered, as well as contextual variables. Only in this way will the technique be refined through systematic validation.

CINEMA AND FILM PORTRAYAL

As with many areas in police work, the movies can play an important role in informing the public about what goes on behind the badge. Some movies (documentary or fictional) may contribute to a better understanding of police procedure; some may obfuscate matters. A few popular examples of hostage negotiation are mentioned in the following.

An incident that was made famous by the movie *Dog Day Afternoon* (Warner Home Video, 1989) gave the NYPD much notoriety over hostage negotiation. This film is a fictionalized version of a bank robbery gone bad, in which police negotiators are called in to peacefully resolve the standoff. It is not an altogether unfamiliar theme in movies of this genre, but, being based on a true incident, *Dog Day Afternoon* can be considered a classic introduction to police hostage/crisis negotiation.

Scenes of hostage negotiation doubtless appear in numerous Hollywood produced movies; one attempt to glean some of these scenes for the benefit of self-reflection occurred at a hostage negotiator conference (Herndon, 2000). One movie that emphasized negotiators as individuals was *The Negotiator* (Warner Brothers, 1998). In this film a wrongfully accused negotiator (Samuel L. Jackson) takes hostages in the police department and will only
negotiate with a fellow negotiator (Kevin Spacey). Techniques and tactics of negotiation are displayed with the intensity and drama of an action film. Of course, the best negotiator wins. In a similar vein, but with a different twist, a made-for-TV movie, *Hostage Negotiator* (USA Network, 2001), tells the story of an FBI negotiator who is set up by her spouse, also an FBI agent who has blown his career; she uses her skills to resolve a hostage standoff involving her own children. Again, superior skills in communication prevail. An older HBO movie, *Dead Silence* (HBO, 1997), that starred James Garner and Marlee Matlin, featured an FBI negotiator (Garner) tasked with resolving a standoff in an old slaughter house where a busload of deaf children were being held as hostages. Personal issues and past mistakes intruded in the negotiator's mission yet all ended well. Taken together, these three films depict negotiators as complex people who have their own personal crises to contend with whilst performing their duties effectively by drawing on experience and training in negotiation.

Two documentaries place hostage negotiation in a more realistic perspective. *A&E* released *Hostage Negotiators* in 1998; this episode of “Dangerous Missions” features pioneers in the field (e.g. Frank Bolz) and former hostages (e.g. Larry Haber) to provide a glimpse of what it is like from both the negotiator’s perspective and that of the hostage. The Discovery Channel aired *On the Inside: Hostage Negotiators* in 2001; it “looked at the difficult jobs of hostage negotiators and their successes in the past 30 years.” Actual incidents are examined and experts are interviewed. One of the incidents was the Waco, Texas, event involving David Koresh and the Branch Davidians. This example is one that has received much criticism because of the disastrous outcome. A recent ABC News (2007) presentation (*Death in Waco*), hosted by Ted Koppel, took a hard look at what went wrong and questioned the FBI’s role.

The popular appetite for negotiator fare was fueled for a while by a short-lived TV series (September 5, 2006–July 20, 2007; 18 episodes) titled *Standoff* (Fox, 2006). The demise of this series may be due in part to poor acting and poor casting as much as it was due to an annoying subplot that involved sexual innuendo among star negotiators. The FBI took a hit when this series aired and failed, at least in terms of negotiator prestige.

A discussion of negotiator films would not be complete without mention of *Inside Man* (Universal, 2006). Starring Denzel Washington, Clive Owen, and Jody Foster, this thriller pits the wits of a detective/negotiator against a shrewd bank robber and his crew, leaving the viewer wondering who actually outwitted whom. It was exciting, but true to life?

The portrayal of hostage negotiation in movies and films, although entertaining and possibly informative, leaves much to be desired in terms of a balanced presentation of the complexities of the field, the intense training in-
volved, the dedication of police personnel, and the importance of behavioral science knowledge to effective crisis resolution.

**FOCUS ON THE FUTURE**

As we consider the history and development of crisis negotiation, the past good and bad challenge us to look to the future with the thought of where the field is going and needs to go. Not much has been written from this point of view. Greenstone (1995) was among the first to lament the divide that has developed between tactical teams and negotiation teams, suggesting that the future should return to a past recognition of the importance of a synergistic effect derived from cross-trained personnel. It is important to remember that negotiation should be given every opportunity to succeed and that a tactical response should not be the police imperative. We only need to look at some recent famous examples to realize that a rush to storm the fortress has disastrous consequences (e.g. Agne, 2003). Take time to talk should be the mantra.

Hancerli (2005) examined the history and development of hostage negotiation on a worldwide scale and offered future recommendations to governments, police agencies, and researchers. Among his five recommendations for governments were that they should always allow negotiation with hostage takers (reversing the policy that “we never negotiate with terrorists”) and trust their own police units to take responsibility and resolve the situation peacefully. For police agencies, he offered four recommendations, including the need for all agencies to establish negotiation teams, that negotiation teams not “compete” with tactical teams because neither is subordinate or superior to the other, and that agencies establish behavioral science units to assist with crisis calls. For researchers, Hancerli recommended that more empirical studies be conducted and that more academic contributions be made to the literature of hostage negotiation resolutions. Greater cooperation between police agencies and researchers will lead to more effective strategies in crisis negotiation.

What the next forty years hold is impossible to predict. By examining the past practices of crisis negotiation and by continuing to examine the process through research and evaluation, the future should be characterized by improvements and refinements in this aspect of police work.
CONCLUSION

Crisis negotiation is an important area of police work. Over the past forty years, the techniques of negotiation have been modified and refined, better selection and training methods have been utilized to build a cadre of highly skilled practitioners, lessons learned have been applied, and the role of behavioral science has been expanded as an adjunct to crisis/hostage negotiation. Research has been, and continues to be, carried out that examines the various aspects of the negotiation process. The future looks bright for crisis negotiation as an effective intervention to difficult situations.

REFERENCES


